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RUSSIAN AMBITIONS IN THE PACIFIC 
Australian War Scares of the 
Nineteenth Century 
[By CLEM LACK, Vice-President, B.A., Dip.Jour., 
F.R.Hist.S.Q.] 
(Delivered to a meeting of the Society on 
22 February 1968.) 
Russian territorial ambitions in the Pacific date back to 
the early 18th century, and Imperialist Russia continued 
throughout the 18th and 19th centuries to haunt the dreams 
of British, and to a lesser extent, of European statesmen. 
The ogre figure of Napoleon Bonaparte, which had dominated 
the fears of the European nations, had scarcely been removed 
from the stage of world history when the Russian bear began 
to throw a lengthening shadow which stretched in the suc-
ceeding decades from the Kuriles to the Khyber Pass; and 
from Kamchatka even to the shores of Botany Bay and Port 
Phillip. 
Fear of bombardment by a Russian fleet and possible 
invasion caused successive war "scares" in the young Aus-
tralian Colonies in the 19th century. The Russians exhibited 
an absorbing interest in Australia, and there is suggestive 
hisitorical evidence that Russia had territorial designs in 
Pacific waters, including the Australian Colonies, which 
would have been an easy prey for lightning raids in the event 
of war with Britain, which at various periods in the 18th 
century was not a remote possibility. Imperialist Russia, 
until her defeat in the war with Japan, and the crushing naval 
defeat of Tsushima, considered the Pacific a Russian lake. 
Alaska, bounded on the north by the Arctic Ocean, on 
the east by the north-west territories of Canada and by 
British Columbia; on the south-west by the Pacific Ocean, 
and the west by the Behring Sea and the Arctic Ocean, was, 
until it became a territory of the United States, known as 
Russian America; in 1799, the entire area came under the 
control of the Russian America Company. It was ceded to 
the United States in 1867 for the payment of $7,200,000. 
The youthful American Republic was justifiably distrustful 
of Russian ambitions in the Pacific. James Monroe, fifth 
president of the United States, was fully alive to the potential 
menace to the future security of the infant Repubhc, created 
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by Russian designs in the Pacific Ocean, as well as the 
inherent threat of interference from European powers. Jeffer-
son and Madison, former presidents, had similar views. Their 
suspicions were well-founded by the march of events in 
subsequent years. 
Indeed, in the early decades of the 19th century, the 
Czar Alexander II, who became emperor of Russia in March 
1855, had territorial ambitions stretching down the wes-
tern coast of the Pacific basin as far as California, where 
Russian secret agents were active. 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 
In October 1823, Russian designs were so evident that 
President Monroe wrote a letter to Jefferson, who was then 
over 80 years of age, seeking his advice on a matter of grave 
international importance: the co-operation of the United 
States with Great Britain to keep European Powers out of 
the Americas. In spite of the fact that Britain and the United 
States had been on terms of practically continuous hostility 
for half a century, George Canning, Britain's Foreign Minis-
ter, had proposed a pact of mutual co-operation to prevent 
European Powers indulging in territorial ambitions in the 
New World. Canning was induced to take this step when he 
learnt that the reactionary Holy Alliance, consisting of 
Russia, Prussia, Austria, Spain, and Bourbon France, was 
plotting to reconquer South America. Jefferson urged 
immediate acceptance of Canning's proposition.* But John 
Quincey Adams, the American Secretary of State, had a 
profound distrust of Canning, and was of the firm 
opinion that the United States should act on its own 
initiative. On 2 December 1823 Monroe sent a message to 
Congress in which he announced that the United States 
should declare any attempt by European powers "to extend 
their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous 
to our peace and safety." Thus was born the Monroe Doc-
trine.^ In 1822, the United States had recognised the revolu-
tionary governments of South America which had thrown off 
the yoke of Imperial Spain. 
1. "The question . . . is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my 
contemplation since that of Independence. . . . Our first and fundamental maxim 
should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to 
suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs."—Jefferson's letter to Monroe, 
24 October 1823. 
2. The "Monroe Doctrine" embodied the principle, "in which the rights and 
interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents . . . are 
henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European 
power. . . . With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we 
have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have 
declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have . . . 
acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing 
them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in 
any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the 
United States." 
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LOUIS NAPOLEON'S MEXICAN ADVENTURE 
Not until 1860 was the Monroe Doctrine threatened by a 
European power. In 1860, Napoleon III, obsessed by 
illusions of a renascence of French Imperialism in the New 
World, which would strike a double blow at British foreign 
policy and put a period to the expansion and development of 
the United States, embarked on the tragic drama of his Mexi-
can adventure, the inspiration of which was to make the 
Second Empire a dominant world power in two hemispheres. 
He found an innocent tool for his ambitions in Maxi-
milian, an Austrian archduke, and younger brother of 
Francis Joseph I, of Austria. With French bayonets he made 
the energetic and liberal-minded Maximilian Emperor of 
Mexico. Maximilian aroused the hostihty of the Liberal 
party in Mexico, and antagonised the Clericals by his promise 
to guarantee religious liberty and the freedom of the Press, 
while at the same time refusing to restore the Church lands 
which the overthrown Juarez Government had confiscated. 
The prospect seemed rosy for Napoleon's plans. The War 
Between the States precluded interference by the United 
States, and Napoleon was confident of Confederate victory 
which would divide and paralyse that country and further 
his imperial plans. But Grant's victory at Appomattox in 
1865 and the surrender of General Lee's Confederate Army 
of Northern Virginia brought the American Civil War to an 
end. Although Lee's Army of Northern Virginia Uterally 
"carried the Confederacy on its bayonets" and made a 
struggle unsurpassed in history, victory for the Union was 
inevitable. 
In December 1865, Congress refused to recognise Maxi-
milian and in the name of the Monroe Doctrine issued an 
ultimatum to France to evacuate Mexico. Napoleon dared 
not refuse. The French army left Mexico, and left Maxi-
milian to his fate. He and his handful of troops were driven 
into Queretaro, besieged, and the hapless Austrian was shot 
by a firing squad after the travesty of a trial. The Empress 
Charlotte had in turn vainly appealed for help to Napoleon, 
to her father, Leopold of Belgium, and to the Austrian 
emperor. When her last hope failed, and Pope Pius refused 
to use his influence with the Mexican Church, she lost her 
reason. 
BRITAIN'S "SPLENDID ISOLATION" 
In the middle of the 19th century Russia became a great 
power under the Romanoff dynasty, and "The Situation In 
The Far East" was a perennial headline on British newspaper 
posters. The Czar Alexander III embarked during his reign 
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on a policy of conquest and the consolidation of Russia's 
dominions. 
At l!his period Britain was committed to a pohcy of 
"splendid isolation"; she was faced with a hostile France in 
Egypt and a hostile Russia in Asia. In May 1882, the Triple 
Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy had become 
an accomplished fact. Britain had never been so alone 
since the days of Napoleon. The shadow of Alexander III 
dogged John Bull at every step, just as Napoleon's did eighty 
years earlier, when the mere mention of Bonaparte terrified 
the baby Britisher in his cradle. 
Both before and after the Crimean War Russia exhibited 
an intense interest in the Pacific, and particularly in the 
Australian Colonies. 
In 1804, the Czar Alexander I, under whose rule Russia 
had emerged as the leading power on the Continent, and had 
extended the limits of the Empire, sent two ships of the 
Russian Navy on a voyage around the world. One of these 
ships was the corvette Neva, and the Russian Government 
had sought and obtained permission for the Neva to pay a 
visit to Port Jackson. But the Neva did not arrive in Sydney 
Harbour until 16 June 1807, in the course of another Rus-
sian voyage of exploration, under the command of Captain 
Leontii Hagemeister. She left on 1 July 1807. 
RUSSIA "SHOWS THE FLAG" 
Following the defeat of Napoleon, in which the terrible 
Russian campaign "broke the back" of Napoleon's Grand 
Armee, Alexander continued to send out ships of the Russian 
Navy to "show the flag" in the Pacific. 
In August 1814, a second Russian ship called in at Port 
Jackson; this was the Suvorov, under Captain Michael 
Lazarev, who had served with distinction as a volunteer in 
the British Navy. Lazarev recorded: "While we were prepar-
ing to cast anchor in this distant port, a great crowd gathered 
on shore and gazed at us with curiosity, as this was the 
second Russian ship to call here since the settlement of the 
English. . . . The authorities fired a Royal salute in honour 
of the Russian victories over Napoleon and the taking of 
Paris by the Allies. . . . It would gladden one to see the 
friendhness with which we were received." 
Lazarev reconditioned the Suvorov in Port Jackson, and 
after spending 22 days in Sydney, he continued his voyage 
to Alaska. He discovered and named several islands of the 
Pacific Ocean. Port Lazarev, a harbour in Broughton Bay, 
on the east coast of Korea, 390 miles from Vladivostok to 
the north, is named after him. 
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In March and April 1820, four other Russian ships visited 
Port Jackson. The Ottkrytie and Blagonamerennoy were on 
a voyage to Alaska, and they were followed by the Vostock 
and the Mirnyi, which were on an expedition to the Ant-
arctic. Captain Thaddeus von Bellingshausen was in com-
mand of the Vostock and Lazarev, making his second visit, 
on the Mirnyi. While in London on their way to the South 
Seas, Bellingshausen and Lazarev had called upon Sir Joseph 
Banks. 
Bellingshausen (1779-1852) was a notable Russian 
explorer. He served in the Russian Navy, and as a lieutenant 
had sailed round the world with Krusenstern (1803-06). 
Adam John, Baron von Krusenstern (1770-1846) was an 
eminent Russian voyager. After serving for some time in the 
British Navy he was commissioned by Alexander I of Russia 
to command a naval expedition of exploration in the North 
Pacific. In the course of a three years' voyage (1803-1806), 
the first made round the world by a Russian navigator, he 
discovered the Orloff Islands, and explored the Marquesas 
and Washington groups, the west coast of Yezo, the coast of 
Saghalien, and the northern Kurile Islands. But he failed in 
the second object for which he was sent out—the opening of 
Russian trade with Japan. 
RUSSIANS IN ANTARCTIC 
In 1819, Alexander I appointed Bellingshausen to com-
mand an Antarctic exploration party, the chief objects of 
which were to ascertain whether reports of an Antarctic 
continent were correct, and to supplement Captain Cook's 
discoveries. After a long voyage in the Antarctic the Vostock 
reached Sydney for repairs and fresh stores on 11 April 
1820, and the Mirnyi on 19 April. The two ships sailed 
from Sydney in company to spend the winter exploring the 
South Pacific. The voyagers were back in Sydney on 9 Sep-
tember 1820, and remained there for seven weeks. 
Before returning to Kronstadt in July 1821, Bellingshausen 
completed the circumnavigation of the Antarctic Continent. 
He sailed over 42 deg. of longitude within the Antarctic 
Circle, compared with Cook's 40 deg., and covered 57,073 
miles. He twice reported in his diary that he had sighted 
what is now known to be the Antarctic Continent, but 
assumed that what he saw were nothing more than very 
large icebergs. He was appointed an admiral in 1831, and 
in 1839 became Governor of Kronstadt, where he died in 
1852. Dr. H. R. Mill has stated (Siege of the South Pole) 
that the voyage of Bellingshausen "was one of the greatest 
Antarctic expeditions on record, well worthy of being placed 
beside that of Cook." 
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Governor Macquarie and Captain John Piper hospitably 
entertained the Russian visitors during their stay in Sydney. 
Bellingshausen was the guest of the Governor. 
In 1832, and again in 1835, the Amerika, a Russian naval 
vessel, visited Sydney. Alarm at the frequency of the visits 
of Russian men-of-war to Australian waters was being 
expressed and this concern was reflected in articles and com-
ment in the Press of the day. It was intensified with the out-
break of the Crimean War, and widespread fears were 
expressed as to the possibility of an attack on New South 
Wales by a Russian invading force. 
As the result of public agitation, the New South Wales 
Government strengthened the fortifications of Pinchgut 
Island, which later became Fort Denison. Pinchgut, known 
to the aborigines as Mat-te-wa-ye, had been christened by 
that name because some of the worst trouble-makers among 
the convicts who arrived in Port Jackson by the First Fleet 
were marooned on the island and kept on short food rations. 
AMERICAN VISITORS 
The fortification of Pinchgut had been projected in 1841, 
and some prehminary work done, as the result of a scare in 
Sydney in 1839—not by the Russians, but by an unheralded 
visit of a squadron of American warships. The ships, com-
manded by Captain Charles Wilkes, of the United States 
Navy, dropped anchor in Sydney Harbour at night on 29 
November 1839 without anybody being aware of the fact 
until next morning! Something like panic seized the authori-
ties when it was realised how easy it would be for a hostile 
warship to enter Sydney Harbour. 
Wilkes, in fact, was the commander of the first maritime 
exploring expedition ever undertaken by the United States. 
The expedition set out from Norfolk, Virginia, on 18 August 
1838. The ships of the squadron were the sloop Vincennes 
(flagship), the sloop Peacock, the brig Porpoise, a storeship, 
and two tenders. The voyage occupied four years, and the 
squadron sailed 90,000 miles, nearly 2,000 of which were 
along the coast of the Antarctic continent, and which the 
United States claimed was first discovered by Wilkes from 
the 158th degree of east longitude. 
THE SCARE OF 1854 
Considerable alarm was felt in Victoria by the Pacific 
cruise of a Russian naval squadron in 1854, and active steps 
were taken to protect Melbourne from sea attack. The com-
mander of the military forces in Australia, Sir Robert Nickle, 
was called upon to organise all available forces. Nickle 
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(1786-1855) had been appointed commander of the military 
forces in Australia, and had reached Sydney early in 1854. 
He took part, as captain, in nine general actions of the 
Peninsular War, and in 1837-38 he served at the outbreak 
of the rebellion in Canada. He moved to Melbourne during 
1854, and had to deal with the disturbances on the goldfields 
at Ballarat. He arrived there just after the military forces 
had captured the Eureka Stockade. Defence activity in the 
Australian Colonies was greatly stimulated by the outbreak 
of the Crimean War (1854-1856), and in August 1854 
authorisation was given for the raising of volunteer forces in 
the various Colonies. 
As a result of Britain's war with Russia, the scanty 
Imperial forces in Australia were reorganised: Army head-
quarters were moved from Sydney to Melbourne; from the 
British point of view this was the most central point, and 
Melbourne also received its mails more quickly from London. 
An elaborate defence scheme for Port Jackson involved 
batteries on Dawes Point, Pinchgut, Bradley's Head, George's 
Head, Middle Head, and South Head; the main fort to be 
located on George's Head. But Sir William Denison, who 
was appointed Governor of New South Wales in January 
1855, had other ideas. A graduate of the Royal Military 
Academy, who, in 1855, held the rank of lieutenant-colonel 
of the Royal Engineers, Denison induced the Legislative 
Council of New South Wales to dismantle all the outside 
harbour forts and concentrate on an earher scheme to fortify 
the inner harbour alone. Pinchgut, renamed Fort Denison, 
in honour of the Governor, was to be the principal key forti-
fication, to be supported by batteries on Dawes and KirribiUi 
Points and on the headland named Mrs. Macquarie's Point. 
Fort Macquarie was also reconditioned. Cost of these fortifi-
cations amounted to more than £60,000; ten years later the 
entire scheme was abandoned, and the plan for the fortifica-
tion of the harbour entrance was revived and adopted. 
In 1854, the Victorian Government undertook to meet 
practically the whole expense of maintaining the Imperial 
forces in that Colony, which then numbered about 700 
troops of all arms. Following a survey of Port Phillip Bay, 
Captain Ross, of the Royal Engineers, recommended the 
stationing of two steam guard ships at Port Phillip, and said 
that 2,000 troops, with a company of engineers and one of 
artillery, would be required for the defence of the Colony. 
He was opposed to fortifying Port Phillip Heads. Active 
preparations for defence got under way on the arrival in 
August 1854 of Sir Robert Nickle, with the headquarters 
staff. Extensive military barracks were planned in St. Kilda 
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Road, and construction was begun on batteries at WiUiams-
town and Sandridge, but with the progress of war in the 
Crimea and the coming of peace, enthusiasm flagged. 
RUSSIA THE POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR 
But on each occasion that cabled reports from London in 
the Press suggested Russian ambitions for expansion, a fresh 
wave of panic gripped the Colonies. On 9 December 1858 
a Royal Commission on the defence of New South Wales, 
over which Major-General Edward Macarthur presided, went 
so far in its report as to actually name Russia as a potential 
aggressor. 
In the following year (1859) volunteering was revived 
when rumours flew from mouth to mouth of another Maori 
War in New Zealand, and worse, of French hostility against 
England, as a result of the sword-rattling policy of Napoleon 
III, the jackdaw of Europe, strutting in the borrowed eagle 
feathers of his uncle. Napoleon Bonaparte. With acute pene-
tration and satiric wit, Victor Hugo described Louis Napo-
leon "Napoleon le Petit." Fear of the Russian Bear was 
long-standing, but Napoleon III had kept Europe quaking in 
its shoes for two decades. It was Britain's fear of the Russian 
Empire which in the Crimean War period, as C. R. L. 
REAR-ADMIRAL POPOV 
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Fletcher points out, gave the French Emperor "the alliance 
of the virtuous and innocent Queen Victoria, and that of her 
virtuous and innocent Prime Minister (Lord Aberdeen)," 
but Czar Nicholas I was a villain built of sterner stuff than 
Napoleon III. 
In January 1859 Napoleon III was preparing for his Aus-
trian adventure; he planned to attack the Austrians in Lom-
bardy, and had a secret understanding with Count Cavour, 
the architect of the unification of Italy. His negotiations 
with Napoleon III for the expulsion of the Austrians from 
Italy precipitated the successful war of 1859, and the ulti-
mate declaration of Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy. At 
the time of his negotiations with Cavour, Napoleon HI was 
allowing strong anti-British propaganda in the French army 
and Press. This campaign began in 1858 and continued well 
into 1860. Palmerston, Britain's Prime Minister, feared 
invasion. Although British fears were unjustified by subse-
quent events, they produced, in the spring of 1859, the 
Volunteer movement, which Lord Wolseley said in 1890, 
"would be remembered as the greatest event in Victoria's 
reign." Palmerston considerably increased Britain's naval 
expenditure, and large sums were spent on fortifications. 
In 1862, the 2,000-ton Russian frigate Svetlana^ visited 
Melbourne, and caused much interest and speculation in 
Victoria and the other Colonies. Large crowds inspected 
the ship which was open to visitors each day, and sight-
seeing Russian sailors were followed in the streets of Mel-
bourne by curious crowds. 
THE SCARE OF 1863 
The Russian "scare" flared up again in 1863, as a result 
of the visit to Melbourne of the Russian corvette Bogatyr, 
the flagship of Admiral Popov, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Pacific station of the Russian Navy. Sensational stories were 
published in the Colonial Press regarding Russian designs on 
Australia. One such story related that Captain Severyn 
Rakowski, a Polish gentleman living in Melbourne, had been 
warned by his nephew, an officer on the Bogatyr, that a 
raid on Melbourne was planned by Russian warships. 
Although no authentic evidence was ever forthcoming of the 
truth of the allegations, there is circumstantial record of 
3. For a very interesting and detailed account of the Svetlana's visit to Melbourne, 
see paper by Verity Fitzhardinge, Russian Naval Visitors to Australia, 1862-1888, 
Journal Royal Australian Historical S o c , Vol. 52, Pt. 2, June 1966, pp. 129-158. A 
paper by Duncan MacCallum, B.A., on The Alleged Russian Plans for the Invasion 
of Australia, 1864, Journal Royal Australian Historical S o c , Vol. 44, Pt. 5, pp. 301-
322, also gives a comprehensive and well-documented account of the subject, particu-
larly with reference to Rakowski's disclosures. 
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Russia's designs in the Pacific at this time, and of her malig-
nant interest in the isolated Australian Colonies with their 
wealth in wool and gold. The statement was made that the 
plan to attack Melbourne was abandoned when Rakowski 
warned the authorities of the intended attack. 
This was to occur in 1864, when war was expected to 
break out between Britain and Russia over the Pohsh 
question. 
The War Between the States was raging in 1863, and there 
was no doubt, in the opinion of British naval strategists and 
commentators, that Russia was profoundly impressed'' by the 
terrible injury inflicted on Federal shipping by the Con-
federate sea raider Alabama, which was later joined by her 
sister predatory cruisers, the Sumter, the Florida, the Georgia 
and the Shenandoah.^ There was the possibility of war 
between Britain and Russia over the Polish insurrection 
which broke out in February 1863. All Europe's sympathies 
were with the Poles, but Britain was suspicious of France, 
the oldest friend of Poland, and this prevented a joint protest 
of England and France against the cruelties exercised when 
"order was restored in Warsaw." The insurrection in Poland 
was suppressed with extreme severity. Britain's Foreign Sec-
retary, Lord John Russell, whose leading political principle 
was non-intervention (e.g. during the American Civil War 
and the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty), contented himself 
with protesting to Russia and was promptly told by the 
Czar to mind his own business. 
The Australian Colonies, fed by speculation in the Times 
and other British newspapers, reprinted in the Australian 
newspapers, had lively visions, in the event of war breaking 
out between Britain .and Russia, of "hit and run" naval raids 
in the Pacific by Russian cruisers, and swoops on major 
Australian cities and seaports by raiders. 
4. The Russian fleet did not distinguish itself in the Crimean War. In the spring 
of 1854 a powerful British and French fleet appeared in the Gulf of Finland; but the 
Russian Fleet declined the combat and kept safe behind the granite fortresses of 
Kronstadt and Sveaborg. In the Black Sea, the Russian Fleet followed the same 
tactics as in the Baltic and took refuge in the fortified harbour of Sebastopol, sinking 
ships across the entrance to keep out the enemy. 
5. Next to the Alabama, the Shenandoah was the most famous of the predatory 
cruisers built in Britain for the Confederacy. "Her career," one Australian news-
paper reported, "reads like the old deeds of Drake and Raleigh on the Spanish 
Main." Ranging the Pacific and Indian Oceans she sank no fewer than 37 Federal 
ships, mostly whalers. The Shenandoah is notable in Australian history because of 
the fact that she steamed into Port Phillip on 25 January 1865, anchored near the 
pier at Port Melbourne, took on coal and supplies and effected repairs, and enlisted 
Australian recruits for her crew. Despite the efforts of William Blanchard, the 
United States Consul in Melbourne, to have the raider detained, the Shenandoah 
slipped away from Williamstown early on 18 February 1865, and resumed her career 
ot commerce raiding. It was a clear violation of neutrality on the part of the Vic-
torian Government, and the visit of the Shenandoah to Melbourne cost the British 
Government £807,375. Total amount awarded the United States by the arbitration 
tribunal at Geneva after the war, in compensation for the destruction wrought by 
Confederate raiders, including the Alabama, was $15 million. 
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THE PANIC OF 1882 
Again in 1882, panic in the Colonies rose to fever pitch 
as the result of a visit to Sydney and Melbourne of a 
squadron of Russian warships under the command of 
Admiral Aslanbegoff. The squadron, which arrived in Aus-
tralian waters in January, consisted of the Afrika (2,850 
tons), flying the Admiral's flag, the Vestnik (1,400 tons), a 
clipper, and the Platon (2,000 tons), a corvette. 
The Afrika and her consorts visited Auckland, Sydney, 
and Hobart. The Afrika, which had been purchased from 
the United States, was a barque-rigged cruiser, and evidently 
was designed as a commerce raider, or as she was described 
by the Australasian Sketcher of 28 January as a "floating 
dodger"—"buoyant and swift, armed to the teeth, and cap-
able of inflicting an immense degree of mischief in destroy-
ing not only armoured ships but the mercantile navy . . . 
able to hit and retire in quick order." The Afrika was of 
1,400 horsepower, had a crew of 275 men, 24 wardroom 
officers, with Admiral Aslanbegoff in command. Captain 
Alesscoff, and Flag-officer Fredericks. She carried 13 guns 
of the most modern design, and was also equipped with 
Whitehead torpedoes, which could be launched by an 
appliance from the main deck. On the main deck also she 
had five guns, built on the Krupp system. They were of 
Russian manufacture, and furnished evidence of the ability 
of the Russian armament-makers to produce naval guns 
equal in every respect to the German model. She was also 
equipped with repeating guns and four-pounders. 
THE RUSSIAN FLAGSHIP "AFRIKA." 
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"SINISTER DESIGNS" 
The most active dramatising of the presence of the Russian 
visitors and the reasons for it was done by the Melbourne 
Age vvhich in February and March pubUshed editorials and 
sensational articles on the sinister designs entertained by 
Aslanbegoff. The Age, under the extremely able and ener-
getic editorship of David Syme, was at this time one of the 
most powerful newspapers in Australia, and Syme, because 
of the influence he exercised through the columns of the 
Age, was, with some justification, known popularly as "the 
uncrowned king of Victoria." In fact, it was true that on 
occasions Cabinet meetings of Victorian Ministries were held 
in his editorial office. The Age was the advocate of a strong 
defence policy, including the development of an Australian 
navy, and Syme published several vigorous and provocative 
articles on the subject. On 15 February, Syme claimed in 
his editorial columns that the visit of the three Russian ships 
was directly associated with the threatened war between 
Britain and Russia, and that the Russian squadron was in 
the Pacific for the definite purpose of raiding British com-
merce. 
Next day, 16 February, Syme published a sensational 
article headed "A Confidential Despatch Intercepted," in 
which he alleged that a long despatch, of which a copy had 
been secretly obtained, had been sent to the Russian Govern-
ment by the Russian admiral, detailing features of Mel-
bourne's vulnerability and unpreparedness, including the 
inadequate armament and mechanical defects of the mighty 
Cerberus. The article also claimed that two more Russian 
frigates, the Wallenski and the Petrolin, were expected to 
reinforce Aslanbegoff's squadron in December. 
The Russian squadron sailed on 24 February for Adelaide, 
where it remained until 3 March. In the meantime the spate 
of speculation and rumour on the intentions of the Russians 
continued unabated in every capital city. 
DEFENCE WORKS 
Throughout February, March and April 1882 highly 
dramatic stories were published by the newspapers in Sydney, 
Melbourne, and Brisbane about the alleged malignant inten-
tions of the Russian visitors. The Melbourne correspondent 
of the Queenslander wrote on 11 March 1882 that Port 
Phillip was to be the point of attack "when the inevitable 
declaration of war between Great Britain and Russia takes 
place. Melbourne was 'the richest city to loot of all the 
Australian capitals,' and it could be shelled and brought to 
surrender easily in 24 hours by such a fleet as that com-
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THE VICTORIAN TURRET SHIP "CERBERUS." 
manded by Admiral Aslanbegoff. Sydney might offer resis-
tance and do damage to the rigging and spars. Adelaide, 
Hobart, and Brisbane did not offer sufficient temptation at 
present." 
Further articles asserted that the half-finished fortifications 
of Port Phillip Bay were to be completed; the fort at Queens-
cliff was to be mounted with 300-pounder rifled guns; the 
torpedo corps was to be reorganised, and a permanent artil-
lery corps of 300 men raised. The new boilers of the 
Cerberus, a turret ironclad, mounting four 18-ton muzzle-
loading guns, were being pushed to completion; and new 
armaments had been ordered. The Nelson, originally a 120-
gun three-decker which, at the time she was launched in 
England in 1814, was the world's largest warship, was to be 
placed "in effective order." 
"A VARNISHED BARBARIAN" 
In an editorial, the Queenslander on 18 March 1882 said 
that there was something more than rudeness in the way the 
Russians behaved in not answering invitations and refusing 
to notice civilities tendered to them by the clubs (in Mel-
bourne). "Admiral Aslanbegoff could not bring himself to 
hobnob with the leading men of the city he intended at no 
distant date to loot. It would be a kind of desecration first 
to drink their champ.agne and then imbue his hands in their 
blood, so the admiral determined to refrain from the usual 
felicities. Such was the theory which had been propounded 
to account for the strange conduct of the admiral and his 
officers. . . . The Admiral took up his quarters at Menzies 
Hotel, and not at the Melbourne or Austrahan Club, and the 
Melbourne people, or the Melbourne Press, have discovered 
the reason. It may be the Admiral's duty to shell the city in 
a few months' time, and he is too much a gentleman, 
although only a varnished barbarian, to play the outrageous 
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hypocrite he might be considered if he mingled in the throng 
of shepherd princes who resort to the Melbourne Qub. 
"The Admiral remembers that it is reserved for him to 
play the part of the Assyrian who came down hke a wolf on 
the fold, and in the circumstances he declined to commit 
himself to misplaced familiarities. The Admiral's gaucheries 
are not without their use. The Volunteers have been 
reorganised, and if Melbourne can only manage to get six 
months' start of the Admiral, she will be ready for him when 
he comes to leave his contribution." 
THE "SCOOP" OF THE CENTURY 
On 23 March the Age came out with the most extra-
ordinary newspaper story of the century. An individual 
describing himself as "Major Bryant" gave a "scoop" to the 
Age which was a tour de force in sensational journalism. 
The astonished readers of the Age learnt over their bacon 
and eggs that war was to be declared between Britain and 
Russia in April 1882. A Russian Fleet of more than double 
the strength of Aslanbegoff's squadron was to pounce on the 
capitals of the several Colonies, and would loot from Mel-
bourne £5 million in specie; £5 million from Sydney; £2 
miUion from Adelaide; and £1,600,000 from Brisbane, in 
addition to untold piUage in stores and merchandise. 
THE "BRYANT" SWINDLE 
"Bryant," in proof of his statements, produced a copy of 
aUeged instructions from the Russian Minister of Marine to 
the Admiral and a copy of a telegram in cypher said to have 
been sent by the Admiral in reply. "Bryant" accounted for 
his possession of these documents by asserting that he was a 
confidential agent of Russia, and that he had assisted the 
Admiral in the preparation of the cypher telegram, which he 
urged that the Victorian Govemment should at once take 
possession of and act upon. 
The facts were that "Bryant" had no confidential relations 
with the Admiral—although he did try to sell him—for 5,000 
roubles — designs for a torpedo that he claimed to have 
invented. The Russian Admiral was also hoodwinked; he 
thought so highly of the "plans" for this "secret" torpedo 
that he cabled a description of it to St. Petersburg at a cost 
of £50. The Russian Minister was not so easily deceived. 
He refused to give credence to the proposal, and "Bryant" 
was informed of Russia's rejection of his offer by the Russian 
Consul in Melbourne. Foiled in swindling the Russian 
Admiralty "Bryant" concocted the extraordinary documents 
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relating to Russia's plans to hold Australia's capital cities to 
ransom, and sold them to the Age.^ 
The Premier of Victoria, Sir Bryan O'LoghUn, decUned to 
violate the secrecy of the telegraph office by inspecting 
Admiral Aslanbegoff's despatches sent through that depart-
ment, but thought it weU, however, to send cables to the 
Imperial Government briefly stating the circumstances which 
the Age newspaper guaranted as "authentic and genuine." 
The reply came back from the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs (Lord Kimberley): "Our relations with Russia are 
altogether of a friendly character, and render such a report 
incredible." 
THE AGE HOAXED 
The Melbourne correspondent of the Sydney Evening 
News said that very few credited the statements of the Age, 
and believed that the newspaper had been hoaxed. The 
Russian Consul had shown the Melbourne Argus a telegram 
he had received from the Russian admiral at Adelaide, signed 
by Captain Alexieff, stating that "Bryant's" proposition had 
not been accepted. When the Age published what was termed 
6. Among papers found in Bryant's possession when he appeared before the court 
on 14 June 1882 on a charge of forging and uttering, was an original agreement 
signed by the editor of The Age, agreeing to give Bryant £25 cash down, with a 
further sum ot £25 by weekly instalments of £5 , and £50 to be paid two days 
after the declaration of war between Britain and Russia. 
ADMIRAL ASLANBEGOFF, from a contemporary print. 
Mitchell Library Print. 
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"intercepted despatches" just before the departure of the 
Russian squadron for Adelaide, the admiral saw Sir Bryan 
O'LoghUn. The admiral was in his cabin with Lieut. Alexieff, 
of the Afrika, and Lieut. Alessa. 
Admiral Aslanbegoff was highly indignant: he said that 
he had been well treated and frankly received everywhere, 
but in Melbourne he had been held up as a spy and a 
trickster. He was eager to take legal proceedings against the 
Age newspaper on the ground that the despatch was a series 
of falsehoods against him. 
DEFENCE OF PORT PHILLIP 
On 25 March the Melbourne correspondent of the 
Queenslander advised that Victoria's state of utter unpre-
paredness for an enemy had been the chief theme dealt with 
by the Melbourne Press for the past week. The same subject 
had occupied the deUberations of the Cabinet. Some years 
previously. Sir William Jervois had given the Ministry of the 
day a complete scheme for the defence of Port Phillip Bay, 
Hobson's Bay, and Melbourne, in addition to a report on the 
coast generally. The works immediately required for the 
protection of the harbour and the capital involved an expen-
diture of about £3 million, the carrying out of which would 
extend over a number of years. The half-finished fortifica-
tions in Port Phillip Bay were now to be completed, and the 
Victorian Agent-General in London (Colonel Paisley) had 
been instructed by the Victorian Cabinet to approach the 
British Admiralty to obtain for the Victorian Govemment 
a gunboat of the Alpha Beta class, carrying a 25-ton gun, 
and two gunboats of the Staunch pattern were to be armed 
with a 12-ton gun, the latter being considered the most ser-
viceable for harbour employment. Two torpedo launches 
were also to be obtained suitable for narrow channels and 
confined waters. 
The correspondent continued: "How we are to man our 
Navy when we have got it, is being discussed. But the dark 
looks of Admiral Aslanbegoff and the discontented mutter-
ings of the officers of the Russian Squadron during their 
recent visit have done some service in organising the Vic-
torian mind on the defencelessness of their position." 
It was evident from these and other extravagant and sensa-
tional references to the Russian visit that Admiral Aslan-
begoff had been elevated to the status of a giant bogey man 
who haunted the dreams of Victorians, whose fears were 
shared by the other Colonies, including Queensland. 
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RUSSIAN STRENGTH IN CHINESE WATERS 
The Age stuck to its guns, and published several articles 
justifying its sensational "disclosures." It quoted, inter alia, 
a statement by the correspondent of the Ballarat Star, who 
traveUed on board the Afrika on her trial trip down Port 
PhiUip Bay after she had come out of the repair dock. He 
related: "I was told by the officers on board the Afrika that 
it was the intention of the Russian Government to send about 
twenty of their men-o'-war now stationed in the Baltic to 
the China Station, as it appeared that if by any chance a 
war did break out between Russia and Britain, the Colonies 
of the latter country would present a most favourable point 
of attack. The fact of their being sent to the Pacific instead 
of being kept in the Baltic was very easUy explained by the 
officers' observation, with some truth, that if they went to 
war with England, their ships in the Baltic would be as good 
as useless, as they would be very easUy blockaded, and 
prevented from getting out of the Baltic, as they were in 
1854-1855, whereas if, say, 30 or 40 ships were stationed 
in the Pacific, they were just as handy for use and always 
available." 
The Sydney Evening News, in this connection, leamt from 
the Hong Kong Daily Times of 3 February 1882 that several 
Russian men-o'-war were stationed on the China and Far 
East Station. These ships included the Abreck, gunboat, 7 
guns; the Asia, cruiser, 12 guns; the Ermak, transport; the 
Gornostal, gunboat, 7 guns; Morge, gunboat, 7 guns; Mos-
cow, transport, 6 guns; Nerpa, gunboat, 7 guns; Prince 
Pujarsky, frigate, 12 guns; Sobol, gunboat, 7 guns; St. Peters-
burg, transport, 7 guns; Strelok, corvette, 9 guns; Tongous, 
gunboat, 9 guns; Vostock, gunboat, 4 guns. 
The Age further published a statement made by its Bay 
reporter, and confirmed by other testimony, to the effect that 
Captain Mitchell, who had acted as coasting pilot of the 
Afrika on the voyage from Hobart to Melbourne, told him 
that he was employed to take the Afrika into the Bay of 
Fires (on the north-east coast of Tasmania) and that he had 
been well paid for it. "What we want to know is why did 
Admiral Aslanbegoff leave the squadron on this expedition, 
and why was the expedition kept a secret, and the report 
circulated that the Afrika had been blown away from the 
squadron in a gale, and that one ship of the squadron had 
actually gone in search of him! . . . " 
The Age virtuously claimed that there were only two tests 
of any value open to it for proving or disproving the truth 
of Bryant's tale, and both were denied to the Age. "Fredrick 
would not teU the Age what he knew about Bryant, and Sir 
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Bryan O'LoghUn would not look at the secret despatch now 
lying at the Post Office. In these circumstances, we had 
nothing else to do but either to keep silent about the whole 
business, or to take what precautions we could to identify 
Bryant. If we had said nothing, the public of Victoria 
would never have known that Admiral Aslanbegoff had been 
negotiating with a foreigner concerning the purchase or 
manufacture of an infernal machine in Hobson's Bay, and 
that he had been making a secret survey of the Tasmanian 
coast while he gave out that his ship had been blown away 
from its consorts in a gale. These two circumstances have 
been elicited by the appearance of Bryant, and although they 
are pooh-poohed by the newspapers who never lose an 
opportunity of taking the side of the foreigner in every 
argument or discussion that turns up, we still think they are 
significant of the Russian designs upon the wealthy and 
poorly defended cities of the AustraUan Colonies. 
"What it seems the Age should have done is to have said 
nothing about Bryant and his secret interview with Admiral 
Aslanbegoff. What if the Cerberus and Nelson had been 
blown up one night at their moorings just before a declara-
tion of hostilities, as one of the American monitors was 
blown up during the American Civil War?" 
THE "COMTE DE BEAUMONT" 
The sequel to the melange of melodrama and Gilbertian 
comic opera associated with the visit of the Russian squadron 
to Melbourne was the exposure of the affaire Bryant by the 
Melbourne detective office as a complete hoax. Henry Bryant 
turned out to be a notorious and artful swindler. His real 
name was Henry de Beaumont, and he had posed as the 
"Comte de Beaumont." According to his own statement, he 
had been employed as a Russian agent. An ex-convict, he 
had been sent to New Caledonia, and was believed to have 
been one of the political prisoners transported from France 
after the Paris Commune of 1871. After having completed 
his term of imprisonment in New Caledonia, Beaumont 
landed in Melbourne, posed as a French count in society, and 
even gained entrance as a guest to Government House. 
His engaging manners and polished conversation secured 
his welcome to the best circles, and ensured his entree to 
exclusive clubs. He lived in a manner appropriate to his 
assumed position. He bought jeweUery which he did not pay 
for, and he borrowed money from wealthy and influential 
persons, whom he forgot to repay. He obtained £60 from a 
French laundress who did his washing for him. After a 
career of swindling enterprises, he was laid by the heels and 
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spent a year in Pentridge Gaol. Shortly after leaving Pent-
ridge, Beaumont introduced himself to the Russian Admiral 
"whom he most effectively bamboozled by tales of artful 
import. . . ." 
Source of this account of Beaumont's activities is the 
Queenslander of 15 AprU 1882. That journal had its own 
correspondent in Melbourne, who fed it with weekly tit-bits 
from the Melbourne Press. 
The Governor of Victoria, the Marquess of Normanby, 
who subsequently became Governor of Queensland (Aug. 
1871-Jan. 1875), was greatly impressed by Bryant, but 
became highly suspicious when the bogus count confided 
that he was short of funds, and casually suggested that the 
Marquess might be kind enough to use diplomatic channels 
to get in touch with a bogus de Beaumont relative, the Duke 
of Leinster. Bryant hoped that the Governor would take the 
bait and offer him a substantial loan to tide him over what 
Wilkins Micawber was wont to describe as a "temporary 
pecuniary embarrassment." The Govemor, who was very 
close-fisted where money was concerned, smelt a rat, and the 
upshot was that the con. man was politely escorted from 
Government House, never to darken its portals again. But 
there were numerous other victims of Bryant's persuasive 
tongue. 
"IMMINENT DANGER" 
In an editorial, the Queenslander of 15 April 1882 com-
mented that the ex-convict Beaumont, aUas Bryant, had 
inadvertently done a public service by attracting attention to 
the unsatisfactory position of the Australian Colonies in the 
event of war. 
"It is plain," said the Queenslander, "that were Russia and 
England to come into collision again, as they did a quarter 
of a century ago, we should be in imminent danger of attack. 
Since the time of the Crimean War the circumstances have 
vastly changed. Then the AustraUan Colonies felt in no 
danger, and contemplated from an unassailable vantage 
ground the bloody struggle carried on before the walls of 
Sebastopol, but the position would be completely changed 
now. The Russians have a formidable fleet in eastern waters, 
and in the event of war, if they did not actuaUy attack the 
Colonies, would keep them in a state of great anxiety. 
"Vladivostok may be, as the Russian admiral lately 
reminded Victorians, 10,000 miles from Melbourne, and the 
difficulty of getting fuel sufficient for a descent upon Aus-
traUa might be almost insuperable, despite the recent opening 
up of coalmines in China and Japan. 
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"But what if the Russian squadron managed at Singapore 
or elsewhere to seize coal to carry them to Newcastle, and 
by a sudden assault, succeeded in keeping possession of that 
great coal port? The position of the Colonies would then be 
difficult indeed, for the British-Australian squadron would 
be helpless for want of fuel, and our mercantile marine 
would be paralysed by the same cause. 
"A few months ago, there was the departure from England 
of a large steam collier with 2,000 to 4,000 tons of coal on 
board for replenishing a coal depot in the eastern seas. A 
vessel of that kind, despatched to meet a Russian squadron 
in Torres Straits, would enable its admiral to entirely sur-
mount the fuel difficulty, and to hurl the whole strength of 
his war vessels against the very ineffective defences of Mel-
bourne, Sydney, or Brisbane. 
FOOLS' PARADISE 
"To ignore these facts is nothing less than to persist in 
occupying a fools' paradise." 
Queensland shared with other Australian Colonies in the 
Russian war scares. By 1862, Queensland had mounted 
rifles, infantry, and artiUery to the number of 248 men. 
British garrison troops were withdrawn from the Australian 
Colonies in 1870. In New South Wales a permanent battery 
of artUlery and two permanent companies of infantry were 
established. A Naval and Military Act, empowering the New 
South Wales Government to raise and maintain permanent 
forces was passed in 1871. Other Colonies followed suit. 
In March 1877, Major-General Sir WiUiam Jervois and 
H.M.S. "NELSON." 
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"MOSQUITO," Queensland Torpedo-boat. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Scratchley, of the Royal Engineers, 
were commissioned to examine and make proposals for a 
correlated scheme for the defence of the Colonies. Plans for 
Queensland included a battery at Lytton, torpedoes (con-
trolled mines) in the Brisbane River, gunboats, and torpedo 
boats.7 The Queensland 1882-1883 Estimates provided for 
the purchase of two gunboats, the Gayundah and the Paluma 
(aboriginal "Lightning" and "Thunder"). Other naval units 
included the Mosquito, a second-class torpedo boat. 
Launched on 16 July 1884 it was the first unit of the Queens-
land Marine Defence Force to arrive in the Colony. A con-
siderable mUitary organisation was also provided for.* 
In 1884, at the beginning of the Jervois-Scratchley re-
organisation, Queensland had a volunteer force of 755 
infantry, 250 artiUery, 60 engineers (including torpedo 
force), or a total of 1,065 men. The total force of the 
various Colonies was 6,380 infantry, 2,410 artillery, 370 
engineers, 118 torpedo force, 145 mounted troops, a total 
muster of 9,423. Queensland in 1885 raised a Scottish 
volunteer regiment; earlier. New South Wales had established 
the Scottish Rifles. The Boer War, to which Australia sent 
nearly 16,200 men, had a considerable influence on the 
country's military ideas, training, and capacity. 
7. Triumph In The Tropics, 1959, Cilento and Lack, Chapter XXV, The Defence 
of the Frontiers, based largely on a paper prepared by Commander N. Pixley, D.S.O. 
8. Moving the defence estimates for 1885-1886, the Premier and Colonial Secretary (Sir Samuel Griffith) warned Parliament that the threat of war was "no idle one," 
and said it was well known that arrangements, including an ample supply of coal, 
had been made by the Russians for attacking the Australian coast. 
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H.M.Q.S. gunboat "GAYUNDAH," flagship Queensland Navy. 
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 
It was the Russo-Japanese War which put a period for 
fifty years—until the resurrection of Russian Imperialism via 
Communism in our own time—to Russia's ambitions in Asia 
and the Pacific. 
At the turn of the 20th century, Russia was preoccupied 
in the Far East. Manchuria and Korea were planned as the 
cornerstones of a Russian Asiatic empire, and the Muscovite 
displayed an ignorant contempt of the "yeUow dwarfs" of 
Nippon. But Japan had been preparing almost ten years for 
the struggle she foresaw was inevitable. Her highly trained 
army had been taught by German instructors, and her navy 
had been likewise trained in the British tradition; her 
Admiral Togo—Count Heihachiro Togo—had been educated 
at the British Naval College at Greenwich. 
When Japan went to war with Russia she got in the first 
blow— j^ust as she did at Pearl Harbour 38 years later. WhUe 
the Japanese Ambassador, on a peace mission, was dancing 
at a ball in St. Petersburg one evening in January 1904, 
"suicide crews" from Togo's squadron outside Port Arthur, 
sneaked into the harbour and torpedoed ships of the Russian 
Fleet. The blow temporarily paralysed Russian naval 
strategy. Seven of the best Russian ships were badly dam-
aged and the Japanese, with command of the sea assured, 
were able to transport their armies to Manchuria. The 
Czar's Government sent out its best admiral, the brilUant 
Ossipovitch Makaroff, to match Togo. Makaroff, a giant 
physically, was one of the world's recognised authorities on 
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torpedoes and was a noted hydrographer. His inspiring 
leadership rejuvenated the Russian Fleet. The reorganised 
squadron, supremely confident of the outcome, issued from 
Port Arthur to do battle with Togo. 
But the stars in their course seemed to be against Russia. 
Makaroff's flagship, the battleship Petropavlovsk, struck a 
mine, and sank with all hands. It was a loss comparable to 
the loss of the Prince of Wales battleship in the Second 
World War, for the Petropavlovsk was the pride of the 
Russian Navy. But the worse disaster was the loss of 
Makaroff. 
RUSSIA'S BALTIC FLEET 
Russia still had her Baltic Fleet. It consisted mainly of 
obsolete ships, but it also included a number of fast battle 
cruisers and two or three powerful battleships, among them 
the giant Suvarov, Russia's most modem "heavyweight" ship, 
the equivalent of the King George V of her day. Russia 
decided to send this fleet to the Pacific in a last desperate 
effort to regain control of the sea and cut off Japanese rein-
forcements in Manchuria, where Prince Kuropatkin was 
locked in terrible land battles with Marshal Oyama's armies. 
But the Baltic Fleet was Ul-found and iU-manned, and no 
worse choice than Petrovich Rozhdestvensky could have been 
made for admiral. He was a brave man and a specialist in 
naval ordnance, but most of his life had been spent ashore 
behind an Admiralty desk. 
The newest and most powerful battleships stood too deep 
in the water so that their heavy armour belts were submerged 
and a useless drag. The untrained crews lacked combatant 
seamen and trained technicians. Shortage of ammunition 
practically prohibited target practice, and a chronic shortage 
of coal made tactical exercises impossible on any scale. 
While the Russian Fleet was passing the Dogger Bank in 
the North Sea, it found itself in the midst of a fleet of British 
fishing smacks and trawlers. These were mistaken for 
Japanese torpedo boats. Panic spread through the Russian 
Fleet. The Russians opened fire, sinking several ships and 
killing and wounding a large number of fishermen. 
On 27 May 1905, the opposing fleets approached each 
other in the Straits of TsusWma. Togo's flagship was the 
Mikasa, British-built and heavUy armoured, 15,000 tons, 
armed with four 12-inch guns and a 6-inch secondary arma-
ment. There were two other Japanese battleships of the 
Mikasa class, and the battleship Fuji, also buUt in Britain, 
12,450 tons, and armed with four 12-inch guns. In addition 
to Togo's four British-built battleships, he had two Italian 
and six other European armoured cruisers. 
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Against this powerful fleet the Russian Baltic Fleet could 
put five good ships and seven inferior vessels. The first divi-
sion included the Suvarov flagship, the Emperor Alexander 
III, the Borodino, and the Orel, four brand-new battleships, 
each with a displacement of 13,500 tons, a speed of 17 knots, 
and the same batteries of four 12-inch guns as the Mikasa. 
The second Russian division was led by the Osliabia, carry-
ing four 10-inch guns, a good specimen of the battleship 
class preceding the Suvarov, the Sissoi Veliki, and the 
Navarin, two older battleships of lower speed and smaller 
size, and the old armoured cruiser Admiral Nakhimoff, 
armed with six 8-inch guns. 
TOGO'S DESPERATE GAMBLE 
Togo had learnt his tactics well from British text-books. 
He succeeded, like Jellicoe at Jutland, eleven years later 
almost to the day, in crossing the T of the Russian Fleet. 
In doing this, he took a desperate gamble on the ineffective-
ness of the Russian gunnery. He turned his leading battle-
ships in the form of a narrow U, a manoeuvre which was 
tantamount to an antagonist in a duel making his opponent 
a present of the first shot at the almost point-blank range of 
three-and-a-half miles. The manoeuvre took 16 minutes for 
Togo's twelve ships to get into the new position, and during 
that time they were exposed to the concentrated fire of the 
Russian Fleet, while Togo's own ships in turning, masked the 
fire of those still coming up. A torrent of 12-inch shells 
splashed around the Mikasa and other ships as they rounded 
the imaginary corner, but the Russian gunfire was appallingly 
bad, and relatively few hits were registered. 
Togo's deployment was accomplished without substantial 
damage, and at a range of three miles he poured into the 
Russian ships a series of devastating salvoes. Showers of 
shells fell upon the Suvarov and the Osliabia. Before 3 p.m. 
the Suvarov was a floating hulk and fell out of the battle line. 
Rozhdestvensky was mortally wounded, and the fleet left 
leaderless. The Osliabia was hit by three successive shells 
near the waterline beneath the forward turret; the sea poured 
through a huge rent in her side, and she heeled over and 
capsized. After the first hour of action all cohesion was lost 
by the Russian Fleet. 
But the Japanese had not escaped unscathed. The Russian 
ships shrewdly concentrated their fire on the Mikasa. The 
percentage of Russian hits was low, but such was the density 
of the shells hurled at Togo's flagship that she was struck 
again and again. Over thirty shells made direct hits on the 
Mikasa, and her casualties were by far the greatest in the 
Japanese Fleet. 
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As night came down, Togo's torpedo boats closed in for 
the kiU. Only half a dozen light cmisers and destroyers 
succeeded in escaping the annihilation which overtook the 
remainder of the Baltic Fleet. Togo's losses were two 
destroyers; Admiral Dewa's cruiser flagship, the Kasagi, was 
put out of action; and Admiral Uriu's flagship, the Naniwa, 
and several other Japanese ships were damaged. 
Tsushima (27 May 1905) was the finishing stroke of the 
war. It was reaUy at sea that the war was decided. The final 
land battle was fought at Mukden, capital of South 
Manchuria. 
"VIA DOLOROSA" 
Tsushima established in naval history the fact that an 
encounter between two hostile fleets of approximately equal 
strength could in certain strategic circumstances lead to the 
destruction of the fleet which, on paper, has the advantage 
over its opponent in gunpower. The Russian Fleet comprised 
five first-class, three second-class, and three third-class battle-
ships, in all mounting 41 heavy guns. Togo could marshal 
only four first-class battleships, and no second and third class 
"heavyweights," but he had eight highly efficient armoured 
cruisers, as against one Russian cruiser. Thus, while the 
Japanese Fleet had an armament of only 17 heavy guns, it 
had a great superiority in 8-inch and 6-inch weapons—110 
to 49. It also steamed 15 or 16 knots to the Russian Fleet's 
10 or 11. 
Also thrown into the scale was possibly the most decisive 
factor of all—the Japanese crews greatly exceUed the Rus-
sians in skill, gunnery, discipline, and morale. Semenoff, in 
his book Rasplata ("The Reckoning"), estabUshed that the 
Russian officers were depressed with heavy forebodings of 
defeat and disaster. As the Fleet entered the Sea of Japan 
one officer, pointing to their course through Tsushima Straits 
on the chart, exclaimed, "Via Dolorosa"; and he and his 
companions cursed the bureaucrats of Petersburg who had 
sent them out to what seamen knew to be disaster. The 
Japanese victory at Tsushima proved the decisive superiority 
of quick and accurate gunnery. The Russian crews were 
bewildered by the rapid succession of hits scored by the 
lighter Japanese batteries. One of the officers of the Suvarov 
declared: "I had never imagined anything like it. Shells 
seemed to be pouring upon us incessantly!" 
[The late Firmin M'Kinnon, a former editor of the 
Courier and the Courier-Mail, was a war correspondent in 
the Russo-Japanese War; he sent the first message announc-
ing the result of the Battle of Tsushima to the British and 
Australian Press.] 
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REVOLT IN RUSSIA 
The war was intensely unpopular with the Russian people. 
Russia was in the throes of a belated Industrial Revolution, 
and the Communist doctrines of Karl Marx were taking root 
in the country. The first disasters of the war with Japan 
stirred the smouldering embers of public discontent into roar-
ing flame. In July 1904, Plehve, the detested Minister of the 
Interior, was kiUed by a well-aimed bomb; on 22 January 
1905, "Red Sunday," a procession of factory workers of 
St. Petersburg, led by Father Gapon, and preceded by sacred 
Eikons, was dispersed by troops, and the leaders shot down; 
in the country, mobs of peasants' plundered and wrecked the 
homes of their overlords; at Odessa the crew of the battleship 
Potemkin mutinied and terrorised the city; and there were 
strikes all over Russia. Eventually the revolution exhausted 
itself; it had been a violent rehearsal and prelude to the Great 
Marxist Revolution of 1917. 
Japan replaced Russia in the years after Mukden and 
Tsushima as the would-be overlord of Asia and the Pacific 
until the Samurai dream vanished in blood and smoke and 
death, and the horror of Hiroshima. In our own time, we 
have seen the re-birth of modern Japan as a great industrial 
power and our best customer for wool, coal, and sugar, and 
the rise of the American colossus to the hegemony of the 
Pacific. 
As the immortal Horace said when Rome was mistress of 
the Western World— 
God shuffles high with low estate. 
Raising the humble, casting down the great. 
While Fortune to and fro on clangorous wings 
Flies plucking crowns, to make and unmake kings. 
APPENDIX 
THE COLONIAL NAVIES 
The first warship built in the Colony of New South Wales was the 
Spitfire, which was launched at Port Jackson in 1855. She was a 
60-ton ship, and mounted a long 32-pounder gun. Both New South 
Wales and Victoria were apprehensive of Russian raids following the 
outbreak of the Crimean War. An armed steamer for the defence of 
Port Phillip was built by the Victorian Government in England. This 
ship was the sloop Victoria, was a twin-screw vessel of 580 tons, and 
was armed with two 32-pounders and one 68-pounder. She arrived in 
Hobson's Bay in May 1856. 
9. These peasants bore more resemblance to the slaves of antiquity than to the 
serfs of the Middle Ages.—Charles Seignobos, History of Contemporary Civilisation. 
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In 1859, as a result of representations to Britain by the Governors 
of New South Wales and Tasmania, the British Admiralty established 
a separate naval squadron in Australian waters. In March of that 
year. Captain Loring, of H.M.S. Iris, hoisted the Blue Pennant and 
assumed command as senior officer of H.M. ships on the Australian 
station, independently of the Commander-in-Chief on the East Indian 
Station. In June 1859, the British squadron on the Australian Station 
consisted of the 26-gun sailing frigate Iris; the 21-gun screw ship 
Pelorus; the 14-gun screw ship Niger; the 12-gun sailing brig Elk; 
and the 11-gun screw ship Cordelia. 
The Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865 provided for a definite 
Colonial naval policy under which Colonies were to be able to 
provide, maintain, and use their own vessels of war under pre-
scribed conditions; to raise and maintain seamen for service; and to 
raise and maintain volunteers for the Royal Naval Reserve. 
In 1866, Victoria obtained from Britain £100,000 towards the cost 
of the Cerberus, a turret ironclad for harbour defence, and the gift of 
the Nelson, originally a 120-gun three-decker, which at the time she 
was launched in England in 1814, was the world's largest warship; 
she had been cut down to a 72-gun two-decker and given an auxiliary 
screw. This Nelson should not be confused with the armoured cruiser 
Nelson, which in 1881 joined the British squadron on the Australian 
Station. The original Nelson became a training ship for the naval 
brigade at Port Phillip. 
The second Nelson, a three-masted ship of 6,600 horsepower, had 
a length of 280ft. overall, a breadth of 60ft., and a displacement of 
7,986 tons. She was regarded as a formidable type of armour-belted 
cruiser, had a complement of 553 officers and men, and was the most 
powerful and largest ship of war in Australian waters. She had a 
belt of armour amidships 180ft. in length and 9in. thick, extending 
from 4ft. above the waterline to 5ft. below. She was equipped with 
a ram, and her armament consisted of four 18-ton guns fore and aft, 
and eight 12-ton guns on the main deck. The upper deck armament 
consisted of six 20-pounder Armstrongs, six Nordenfeldt machine 
guns, and two Gatling guns. Steel wire torpedo nets encircled the 
ship for defensive purposes. She also carried two second-class torpedo 
boats, and four of the five steam-pinnaces and cutters she carried 
were fitted to fire Whitehead torpedoes. 
The Cerberus was the first armour-plated monitor or turret ship. 
Laid down at Yarrow in September 1867, she became in 1870 a unit 
of the Victorian Navy, and was Australia's first battleship. She was 
an iron-plated twin screw turret ship, the first of her class. Her 
overall length was 235ft., with a 45ft. beam. A 250 h.p. marine 
engine drove her at a speed of nine knots. The Cerberus was armed 
with four muzzle-loading guns with a 10-inch bore, and fired a 4001b. 
shell. The naval battles of the American Civil War had demonstrated 
to the world that the wooden man-o'-war was no match for an 
armoured vessel. The hull of the Cerberus was protected by a belt of 
armour 6in. to Sin. thick in the middle and tapering towards the 
stern and bows, and extending from the gunwale to well below the 
waterline. The Cerberus was really a floating fort; she could be moved 
at speed to any part of Port Phillip Bay. The deck was liin. thick, 
and all hatches and skylights were armoured. Her deck was a citadel 
with sides of armour 8in. and 9in. thick, a protected deck above, and 
a turret at each end. In action, every man in the ship would be under 
armour. 
On 1 April 1921 the training establishment in Victoria was trans-
ferred to Flinders Naval Depot, and on the same day the Cerberus 
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was removed from the Navy List. Filled with concrete, her hull now 
does duty as a breakwater off Black Rock, on Port Phillip Bay. 
In 1881, the British Admiralty gave New South Wales the screw-
corvette Wolverene as a training ship. In addition to the Cerberus 
and Nelson, the Victorian Navy included the Victoria, cruiser, the 
Childers, a first-class torpedo boat, and two second-class torpedo 
boats. 
In 1884, the Queensland Navy included the gunboats Gayundah 
and Paluma, and the torpedo boat Mosquito. In 3ie same year South 
Australia obtained the heavily-armed cruiser Protector. 
It was in this period when another Russian "scare" was being 
experienced that the British squadron was strengthened by the arrival 
of the Nelson, and by the appointment of Rear-Admiral George (later 
Admiral Sir George) Tryon (1832-93)—the first Admiral in charge 
of the Australian Station. 
As a result of his consultation with the Colonial Governments, the 
agreement of 1887 was reached whereby the existing British squadron 
in Australian waters was to be supplemented by an auxiliary 
squadron. It was as a result of his advocacy of the principle of 
personal service, that the Australian Navy had its genesis, and sub-
sequent development. 
In 1891, Admiral Tryon took command of the British Fleet on the 
Mediterranean Station. During manoeuvres by the British Mediter-
ranean Fleet, on 22 June 1893, off Beirut in Syria, the ships of the 
Fleet were steaming in two columns, 1,200 yards apart. Tryon 
ordered that the course was to be inverted in succession, turning 
inwards. The distance between the columns was insufficient, and 
Tryon's ship, the Victoria, colhded with the leading ship of the other 
column, the Camperdown, and sank in a few minutes. Tryon and 
358 officers and men lost their lives. 
THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CRUISER "PROTECTOR." 
